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Protocols for mass antibiotic prophylaxis against
anthrax were under development in New York City begin-
ning in early 1999. This groundwork allowed the city’s
Department of Health to rapidly respond in 2001 to six sit-
uations in which cases were identified or anthrax spores
were found. The key aspects of planning and lessons
learned from each of these mass prophylaxis operations
are reviewed. Antibiotic distribution was facilitated by limit-
ing medical histories to issues relevant to prescribing pro-
phylactic antibiotic therapy, formatting medical records to
facilitate rapid decision making, and separating each com-
ponent activity into discrete work stations. Successful
implementation of mass prophylaxis operations was char-
acterized by clarity of mission and eligibility criteria, well-
defined lines of authority and responsibilities, effective
communication, collaboration among city agencies (includ-
ing law enforcement), and coordination of staffing and sup-
plies. This model can be adapted for future planning needs
including possible attacks with other bioterrorism agents,
such as smallpox.
A
s part of national bioterrorism preparedness efforts,
New York City began actively developing protocols
for the distribution of mass antibiotic prophylaxis against
anthrax in early 1999. These efforts were led by the
Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management, in close col-
laboration with the New York City Department of Health
(DOH). The goal of the plan was to have the ability to pro-
vide mass antibiotic prophylaxis to 8 million New Yorkers
over a 48-hour period—in the worst-case scenario of a
large-scale bioterrorism attack—without impinging upon
the capacity of local medical facilities to respond to the
needs of persons affected by the biological agent. Here, we
highlight aspects of New York City’s emergency planning,
the circumstances of the six actual implementations in the
city in 2001, and the lessons we learned.
Planning 
New York City’s government agencies, including DOH,
are part of an incident command structure that reports to
the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management during
public emergencies (1). In 1999, this department estab-
lished an internal incident command structure, composed
of the following: clinical response, sheltering, surveil-
lance, environmental health, laboratory, communications,
management information systems, and physical plant oper-
ations components. “Round-the-clock” coverage was
adopted at all agency levels. These teams are operated by
persons from a variety of the city’s DOH programs. 
Chronology of Events
On October 9, 2001, New York City’s DOH was noti-
fied of a possible case of cutaneous anthrax in a female
staff member of a nightly news team at a large media com-
pany (Table 1). On October 10, the department’s incident
command system was put into effect, and team leaders
were informed of the situation. From then until October
12, 2001, when the diagnosis was confirmed, DOH final-
ized an antibiotic distribution plan, including development
of a medical charting system, standing orders for dispens-
ing antibiotics, training curricula for staff, and reproduc-
tion of antibiotic fact sheets (in English and Spanish).
Clinical materials were reviewed by the department’s gen-
eral counsel, and scripts were developed for information
hotlines. DOH staff were identified and reassigned to this
effort.
On October 12, 2001, the department began collecting
nasal swabs and distributing prophylactic antibiotics to
persons working at the media company who might have
been exposed to a letter implicated in the index case.
Included in this effort were those working on the same
floor as the index patient. Initially, the exposure source
was believed to be a letter postmarked September 25,
2001, potentially exposing an estimated 200 persons. This
letter was tested for Bacillus anthracis multiple times,
however, and all tests were negative (2). 
Within hours of the Mayor’s public announcement of
this case, DOH and the Office of Emergency Management
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point of distribution [POD]), at the main building that
housed the media company. The space provided for pro-
phylaxis was in the same building complex that housed the
letter but did not share the ventilation systems that served
the areas in the letter’s path. The layout of the space pro-
vided for the POD and its operations could not accommo-
date large groups of people seeking antibiotics. Moreover,
the letter was a matter of a criminal and epidemiologic
investigation, so law enforcement agencies needed to con-
duct their own interviews on site. Thus we coordinated
with law enforcement personnel to minimize disruption of
client flow and ensure that client medical confidentiality
would not be compromised. The epidemiologic aspects of
the investigation were initially incorporated into the med-
ical record used. 
Soon after distribution of antibiotics was begun, the
source of anthrax was confirmed to be a letter postmarked
September 18, 2001. Consequently, the time interval dur-
ing which exposure may have occurred was reevaluated
and the number of people possibly exposed substantially
expanded. 
Between Friday, October 12, and Tuesday, October 16,
after approximately 42 hours of operation and an average
of 55 staff persons per shift, 1,322 persons were briefed,
completed epidemiologic and law enforcement inter-
views, underwent medical assessments, had nasal swabs
taken to better define exposures, and were given a 14-day
supply of antibiotics within the POD space. The average
throughput time (the time from a client’s entry into the
POD space to exit) was 30 minutes per client. Initially, the
briefing of staff consisted of providing written materials.
This system was augmented by a combination of informa-
tion distributed over closed-circuit television throughout
the still-operating company and by direct electronic com-
munication from the company’s senior management.
Within the first day of operations, it became apparent that
both potentially exposed and unexposed persons needed
emotional support and further information about the
event, the risk for anthrax exposure, and the dangers of
antibiotic misuse. Counselors (medical and mental health)
were made available immediately outside the POD, and
hotline staff were given scripts to assist them in answer-
ing concerned callers. The city’s DOH supplied each
potentially exposed person with an initial 2-week course
of antibiotics to provide time for public health officials to
complete the investigation and develop specific criteria for
persons needing to complete the balance of the 60-day pro-
phylactic regimen. 
Once the investigation was complete (October 20,
2001), DOH narrowed the criteria for antibiotic prophylax-
is to those met by the 12 persons who directly handled the
contaminated letter and recommended that all others dis-
continue antibiotics. This general information was com-
municated by the employers to all antibiotic recipients and
by letters mailed from DOH to affected persons. We also
directly contacted all 12 persons who needed to continue
prophylaxis. Ultimately, 60-day inhalational anthrax pro-
phylactic regimens were provided to 11 persons (6 work-
ing in the building and 5 involved in the recovery of the
tainted letter) largely by means of the on-site employee
health unit. One person refused prophylaxis. We later
assisted the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in
evaluating adherence and adverse drug effects among
those receiving 60-day regimens.
Four cutaneous anthrax cases were subsequently identi-
fied in New York City; these cases occurred at three other
media outlets (one case each at two locations and two
cases at the third) (3). All of these cases were believed to
be associated with contaminated mail. No inhalational
anthrax cases were associated with the media outlets.
These three PODs served persons potentially in direct con-
tact with the suspect letters. POD activities, however, were
restricted to registration, provision of printed information,
epidemiologic interviews, and obtaining of a very limited
number of nasal swabs within the POD space.
Subsequently, the decision to provide antibiotics was
based on confirmed exposure, as determined by the epi-
demiologic investigation. Antibiotics were dispensed on an
individual basis, as was monitoring for adherence and
adverse events. Epidemiologic and law enforcement inter-
views and large informational sessions for all staff were
held separately, in separate locations, and at different times
from those for the POD. Counseling was available imme-
diately after the information sessions or thereafter through
the DOH anthrax hotline. 
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Table 1. Chronological summary of six anthrax events requiring PODs  
Event  Location 
No. of eligible 
persons registered 
Total hours of 
operation 
Briefing format for eligible 
persons oral/written  Antibiotics  Nasal swabs taken 
1  Media 1  1,322  42  No/yes  Yes  Yes 
2  Media 2  763  36  No/yes  No  Yes 
3  Media 3  175  25  Yes/yes  No  Yes 
4  Media 4  354  14  No/yes  No  Yes 
5  USPS  7,081  67  Yes/yes  Yes  No 
6  Hospital  1,923  28  No/yes  Yes  No 
aPOD, point of distribution (for antibiotics); USPS, U. S. Postal Service. The fifth POD was conducted in New York City by the
U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS). This site’s purpose
was to provide an initial 10-day course of antibiotics to
prevent inhalational anthrax in ~7,000 postal employees
who worked at facilities that processed the anthrax-con-
taining letters sent to the above referenced media outlets
(events 1–4). Although no anthrax cases had been reported
among the city’s postal workers, inhalational anthrax cases
had occurred in postal workers in New Jersey and in the
Washington, D.C., area (4). Anthrax spores were subse-
quently found in one of New York City’s postal facilities.
Both labor and management at affected facilities requested
prophylaxis for inhalational anthrax. As these were federal
facilities and federal employees, prophylaxis efforts
remained in the jurisdiction of the federal government. The
POD was conducted by USPHS in the basement of a New
York City mail-processing center (5). U.S. Postal Service
management was instrumental in securing space and iden-
tifying and scheduling staff. USPHS determined the initial
operational layout, medical charting, and staff needed for
this effort on the basis of its prior experiences in the
Washington, D.C., area postal facilities. Additionally, writ-
ten information was deemed insufficient for this setting.
The increased throughput time reflects the inclusion of
extensive live briefings accommodated within this POD
space. 
Liaisons from DOH’s clinical response team were
assigned to this effort as consultants. DOH’s role was lim-
ited to increasing the efficiency of POD operations. We
assisted USPHS effort by providing detailed clinician
training materials, medication fact sheets, and on-site flow
analyses with recommendations to improve client through-
put on the basis of local POD experiences. Collaborative
efforts also included the timely sharing of information with
DOH for response to public inquiry, DOH assistance in
establishing local medical and mental health referral pat-
terns, and follow-up of these referrals. USPHS, in turn,
accommodated visits to the operation by members of the
New York City Office of Emergency Management and
DOH staff for educational purposes. 
Between Wednesday, October 24, and Saturday,
October 27, in approximately 67 hours of operations with
65–70 staff persons per shift, this fifth POD provided
7,081 persons with a 10-day supply of antibiotics. The
POD provided registration; completion of a medical
screening form; detailed live briefings on risk for expo-
sure, signs and symptoms of anthrax, and side effects of
the recommended antibiotics; medical screenings; and
antibiotic distribution. The average throughput time for
these activities was 33 minutes per client. In addition to the
medical personnel who were on site to evaluate symptoms
and adjust antibiotic regimens, staff were available for
mental health and other counseling issues. Epidemiologic
and law enforcement interviews were conducted separate-
ly; no nasal swabs were collected because >30 days had
elapsed since the suspect letters were processed. The fed-
eral agencies directly managing prophylactic efforts subse-
quently offered additional prophylactic antibiotics with or
without the anthrax vaccine to those persons thought to
have been most highly exposed to aerosolized B.
anthracis. 
On October 28, 2001, DOH was notified of a case of
inhalational anthrax in a 64-year-old woman working in a
hospital stockroom. The patient had no discernable associ-
ation with the media companies or the postal service,
although a section of the stockroom where she worked was
adjacent to the hospital mailroom (6,7). While environ-
mental samples were being collected, DOH immediately
set up a POD (event 6) for hospital staff, patients, and vis-
itors who had spent >1 hour in the hospital since October
11 and thus might have a risk for exposure to aerosolized
B. anthracis. During the environmental investigation, the
hospital was closed. 
Between Monday, October 29, and Friday, November
2, over the course of 28 hours and with a staff of 53 per-
sons per shift, 1,923 persons received prophylactic antibi-
otics. Epidemiologic and law enforcement interviews were
targeted to include only hospital staff. Nasal swab speci-
mens were collected from 28 persons who worked in and
around the mailroom. The average POD throughput time
was 6½ minutes per person. POD activities involved regis-
tration, triage, medical evaluation, dispensing antibiotics,
counseling, and overall management. No informational
sessions were conducted; however, written information
(including DOH hotline telephone numbers) was distrib-
uted, and counseling staff were available. Nasal swabs
were not routinely collected. This POD, which was situat-
ed in a hospital and focused on hospital personnel, was
facilitated by close collaboration with the hospital admin-
istration, which helped coordinate prophylaxis efforts and
mobilize hospital staff to assist in POD operations. 
Antibiotic distribution was discontinued on November
2, when all environmental samples from the hospital test-
ed negative for B. anthracis. By mail, DOH informed all
persons provided with antibiotic prophylaxis to discontin-
ue their regimens. 
Discussion 
Planning versus Reality
Prior emergency planning addressed large-scale events
affecting 8 million New York City inhabitants; under those
circumstances, ordinary medicolegal considerations would
not apply (e.g., no provider-patient relationship invoked;
no need for medical charting, nonprofessionals used for
staffing). Our PODs were initiated before the extent of
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sons most likely to have been exposed. Clearly, the inten-
tional release of anthrax affected far fewer than the pro-
jected worst-case scenario. 
Consequently, our PODs were more “classically” mod-
eled, i.e., they included a large staff of licensed medical
professionals who obtained consents, took medical histo-
ries, collected specimens, and dispensed antibiotics. A full
medical charting system was available, as were mental
health and medical counseling services, at each site. These
services were augmented by toll-free hotlines. 
Client Screening, Functional Units, and Flow Patterns 
Clients were persons meeting eligibility criteria for
receiving antibiotics and thus granted access to the POD.
Ineligibles, or the “worried well,” were persons who did
not meet the eligibility criteria to enter the POD or receive
antibiotics within the POD; they were offered information-
al materials, the opportunity to speak with counselors, and
access to the DOH public hotline.  
The POD proper is defined as the space where patients
are registered, triaged, have swab samples taken (as neces-
sary), evaluated medically (as necessary), and provided
with antibiotics. Other POD-related activities (which may
or may not be part of the layout of the actual POD space)
include assessing the eligibility of persons who present
themselves, reassuring the worried well, briefing clients
about anthrax and POD operations, collecting information
for investigative purposes, transferring persons to a med-
ical facility (when needed), counseling, managing client
flow, and maintaining security. 
Immediately outside the entrance to the POD, we
placed a screening station, where POD staff verified eligi-
bility and gave eligible persons writing tools, an informa-
tion sheet, the epidemiologic interview form, the law
enforcement interview form, and a medical record form to
complete. Articulating clear eligibility criteria and obtain-
ing verifiable lists of names of persons expected at the
POD (including relevant contractors such as housekeeping
and house security) helped maintain order at the front door.
As these events occurred in occupational settings, manage-
ment was critical in communicating public health mes-
sages to staff, identifying and scheduling staff access, and
setting clinic hours to maximize the flow of the prophylac-
tic effort; strong management resulted in organized PODs
and responses.
Because bioterrorism is a criminal act, law enforcement
agencies had a separate and independent purview for
investigation. Performing investigative interviews first and
separately from the POD proper alleviated concerns about
maintaining client medical confidentiality and facilitated
client flow, although this was dictated largely by the layout
and physical capacity of the space allotted. Furthermore,
investigative interviews involved more well-defined and
smaller subsets of persons with each subsequent POD. 
The client registration process also evolved with each
POD. Initially, identifying data were handwritten in a log-
book. This system was supplanted by the use of a single
spreadsheet on a laptop, and finally, by the second day of
the first POD, by several laptops with data-entry screens
and wireless connections to an on-site server. These adap-
tations permitted rapid tracking of clients served and facil-
itated subsequent correspondence through the production
of mailing labels. This system was upgraded and used at
subsequent DOH PODs. As we quickly adopted a comput-
erized registration process, management information sys-
tem staff provided on-site technical support. 
After registration, clients moved into the triage area,
where an assessment was made about whether they could
proceed directly to the dispensing station or needed to be
medically evaluated before a final determination on pro-
phylactic antibiotics could be made. All clients not eligible
for immediate receipt of prophylactic antibiotics were
triaged to the medical evaluation area. There, staff (physi-
cians, nurses, and physician assistants) determined the
appropriate prophylactic medication choice or need for
further evaluation and transfer to a healthcare facility.
Because a limited number of circumstances require alter-
ation of the prophylactic regimen or of a client’s original
medication regimen (~10% of all clients), we created a
clinical algorithm and preprinted instruction sheets for
those situations. 
Antibiotics were distributed at the dispensing station, as
were fact sheets explaining antibiotic use. This station was
staffed by nurses, physicians, or pharmacists, as resources
permitted. Having at least one pharmacist present proved
useful. 
Because some clients were overwhelmed by the situa-
tion and had residual questions, mental health, medical
advisors, and public health educators were available at the
POD entrance and near the POD exit for consultation.
Also, by referring persons to the hotline and website, we
limited the need for on-site counselors. 
Security is an essential feature of POD operations. The
New York City Police Department provided this service.
Officers maintained order at the entrance and exit, so that
the POD was not overwhelmed with anxious and angry
persons (either those at risk or the worried well), and
guarded pharmaceutical supplies. 
Persons devoted solely to ensuring the smooth flow of
clients into the POD, from one area (or station) to the next,
and out of the POD also were essential. These flow man-
agers, or “traffic” personnel helped minimize client-wait-
ing times and staff idle time and improved throughput
times. An area for clerical staff to manage medical chart-
ing within the POD also was necessary. 
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Each POD was conducted differently, combining a
standardized response for anthrax prophylaxis with the
unique needs of each setting. Services provided within the
POD space varied. The space allotted, the POD staffing
available, preexisting circumstances (e.g., organizational
structures, historic relations between labor and manage-
ment, client characteristics), and ongoing field assess-
ments determined the array of services offered. Similarly,
POD work-shifts were defined on the basis of need,
resources, and input from representatives of those affected. 
Staff and Space Needs 
The most important element for an efficient POD
process is adequate staffing to operationalize antibiotic
distribution and to ensure that anticipated language needs
of the clients are met. Ideally, an organizational diagram
should be in place, along with a brief description of the
role of each staff member and any training documents nec-
essary. The organizational chart we found most useful is
shown in Figure 1. Four critical positions are the executive
liaison, physician-in-charge, supplies coordinator, and
clinic manager; their primary responsibilities are outlined
in Table 2. We learned that the physician-in-charge should
be dedicated solely to running the POD. A second public
health officer should be on-hand to convene regularly with
key representatives of potentially exposed populations. 
The POD site should be conveniently located for those
affected but should not be located in a place that might be
contaminated with B. anthracis. Ideally, site options
should be considered well before the need for such a site
arises. Selecting a space and arranging stations to promote
continuous flow of clients (including the disabled and chil-
dren in strollers) proved important. To distribute antibi-
otics to 500 to 10,000 clients over a 72-hour period, a
space of at least 2,500 square feet for the POD proper was
necessary. To minimize the impact of unanticipated space
issues, we subsequently developed several possible floor
plans, so that a quick assessment of layout could be made
during subsequent site selection (Figure 2, A and B) and a
predesigned floor plan could be adapted to a particular sit-
uation. Despite the urgency of the situation, allocating ade-
quate time before opening a POD is critical to ensure that
supplies have arrived and trained staff are ready to begin
operations. 
Client Flow through the POD
Our PODs operated most efficiently when activities
were handled at discrete workstations. As we progressed
though the six events, we also realized the utility of phys-
ically separating activities for which clients may need to sit
from those that did not require sitting. It was most time-
efficient if clients did not sit to receive clinical services,
and most space-efficient if no chairs were available for
clients. Paperwork and interviews were best suited to
occur outside the POD proper, since clients found it easier
to fill out forms and participate in interviews while sitting.
Thus space allocation should also include a space, prefer-
ably outside the POD proper, for these “seated” client
activities (i.e., filling out forms and conducting interviews)
to ease the difficulties of moving people through the POD.
Persons able to perform briefings and translators (includ-
ing those skilled in sign language) should be available in
this area to assist with questions. 
Streamlined Medical Chart
The medical chart was revised between events. Initially,
we obtained very structured medical histories and collect-
Emerging Infectious Diseases • Vol. 9, No. 6, June 2003 619
POLICY REVIEW
Figure 1. Point of distribution
(POD) site organizational chart.




of Health. Dotted boxes = areas
of responsibility; dotted lines =
shared communications.*For
operational purposes, the epi-
demiologic team leader report-
ed to the PIC.ed nasal swabs from all clients, creating tremendous
delays. With subsequent PODs, we redesigned our medical
chart to be a one-page (two-sided), self-administered ques-
tionnaire, limited to information relevant to the rapid dis-
tribution of antibiotics. The chart included personal con-
tact information (e.g., address, telephone numbers, and
identification of emergency contacts), a signed consent
form for testing and treatment, brief medical history (pres-
ence or absence of current anthrax symptoms, relevant
drug allergies, use of specific medications known to inter-
act with doxycycline or ciprofloxacin, pregnancy status),
as well as a place to document nasal swab collection, the
dispensing and receipt (or refusal) of antibiotics, and
antibiotic lot numbers. A separate medical record was cre-
ated for pediatric clients and followed the same general
formatting. Also, as the utility of nasal swabs became bet-
ter understood, DOH progressively restricted the epidemi-
ologic criteria for obtaining them, relieving an important
system bottleneck at triage. 
Short Briefings 
If necessary, live briefings need to be short and should
include multiple briefing stations with good sound sys-
tems. Staggered briefings (i.e., 7–10 minutes in length,
beginning every 5 minutes) helped distribute client flow.
Including information on antibiotic dosage and side effects
in these briefings was useful. Persons able to perform
briefings and translators (including for sign language)
should be available in this area to assist with questions.
Clients may be provided with a written information sheet
in lieu of a briefing, a step that improves client flow; a
counselor can be available to handle further questions. 
Communication 
Careful attention to communication at a variety of lev-
els is critical, including from the incident command center
to the POD and from the health department to the public
and to community medical providers. Also important was
the flow of information from public health officials to rep-
resentatives of the community receiving prophylaxis, and
to the community itself. Without such attention, centrally
made decisions might not be communicated to POD staff,
resulting in mistaken expectations. 
Cell phones and two-way radios were important means
by which to communicate. Electronic mail was not avail-
able for POD staff. Materials initially developed required
continuous updating of facts, whether or not new informa-
tion was available (e.g., “There are no new cases of
anthrax as of today.”). These materials needed to be appro-
priate for public use. Materials were used at POD sites, for
DOH hotline scripts, and on the DOH website. Information
was also disseminated by means of press releases and press
conferences. 
The format for communicating with POD clients—
including printed materials, live briefings, or both—was
decided jointly by management and public health officials
on the basis of resources, the extent and severity of actual
cases, and knowledge level of the clientele. The medical
community was kept abreast of recent developments
through multiple broadcast faxes, emails, and website
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Table 2. Job titles and primary responsibilities recommended for PODs  
Job title  Primary responsibilities 
Reports to the incident commander 
As senior staff member in the field, coordinates both the investigation (epidemiologic and environmental) and the 
prophylaxis effort 
Interfaces between the public health agency and the organization representing those to receive prophylaxis 
Executive liaison 
Ensures that the physician-in-charge is informed of recent developments of the investigation, as well as other information 
from Department of Health command center briefings (i.e., changes in treatment recommendations, eligibility criteria, or 
reports of organism antibiotic susceptibilities) 
Reports directly to the executive liaison, keeping him or her appraised of progress and problems 
Is responsible for the overall POD operations, including site selection, POD set-up (including floor plan and staff training), 
ensuring communication among POD stations, and overseeing collection of epidemiologic and law enforcement data 
Physician-in-charge 
Is responsible for on-site oversight of the epidemiologic investigation, the supplies coordinator, the medical service staff 
(e.g., physicians, nurses, pharmacists, mental health professionals), and the clinic manager 
Ensures that all forms, supplies, and equipment are available at the POD when needed (prepared in advance, supplied to 
POD, and replenished as needed)
b 
Supplies coordinator 
Is responsible for transportation of staff and material 
Oversees nonclinical operations within the POD, such as staffing, patient flow, clerical, and MIS operations, 
communications, medical records retention, and quality improvement activities 
Clinic manager 
Coordinates activities with the supplies coordinator 
aPOD, point of distribution (of antibiotics); MIS, management information systems.  
bSupplies to be provided include general supplies (medical charts, epidemiologic questionnaires, preprinted training instructions for staff at various stations, literature for 
patients and staff, medical charts, office supplies, white coats, and other clothing with appropriate insignia for nonclinical personnel), laboratory supplies (if needed, 
nasal swabs, laboratory requisitions forms, specimen bags, specimen labels, water-free hand sanitizing solution, and disposable laboratory gowns, gloves, and biohazard 
bags), and pharmaceutical supplies (antibiotics [in adult and pediatric dosages], a copy of the Physician’s Desk Reference, and medication fact sheets for each drug to be 
dispensed). updates from DOH and by quickly establishing a DOH
physician hotline staffed by medical professionals. In sum-
mary, DOH established three separate hotlines, one each
for physicians, those clients directly affected by POD
operations, and the general public. 
Preplanning
Events that require a POD (i.e., intentional dissemina-
tion of virulent organisms) are stressful for all involved. In
a public health emergency, little time exists between the
decision to open a POD and initiation of operations.
Planning can help alleviate the need to make decisions
under pressure and can ensure quality of effort. The inter-
val before opening the POD can then be used for truly last-
minute preparations: mobilizing and orienting personnel,
finalizing briefing sheets, and selecting a POD location
and layout. 
Training should also begin well before an emergency
actually occurs so that staff assigned to assist with POD
operations are familiar with the process, forms, and data-
entry screens and have a personal emergency plan in place
(e.g., child and pet care, transportation) to accommodate
an altered work schedule. Having each staff person’s tasks
be limited enough to be “digestible” in a short orientation
session at the time of POD operations is also helpful. The
local health department can prepare for mass prophylaxis
efforts by developing a standing set of employee rosters
for round-the-clock coverage in 12-hour shifts, with
approximately 50–55 persons per shift. This schedule
enables antibiotic prophylaxis to be provided to up to
10,000 persons in 72 hours. 
Advance Resource Building 
Amajor difficulty in staffing a POD with health depart-
ment staff, especially in small health departments, is that
these staff are removed from their regular duties. One
approach to minimize the effect on single programs is to
compose teams from a variety of programs. Another strat-
egy is to use staff from preexisting program groupings,
with existing work relationships. 
Most health departments are not poised to handle single
large POD efforts (>10,000 persons) or even multiple con-
current ones for <10,000 persons. To preserve the integri-
ty of public health functions during large or concurrent
POD mobilizations, partnerships are necessary to mobilize
qualified personnel from a variety of resources in and
around the affected community. Thus, health departments
need to have established relationships with other organiza-
tions (e.g., Visiting Nurse Service, American Red Cross)
that can assist if needed. Any mobilization across agencies
will be facilitated by prior communication and coordina-
tion on issues such as deputization,
2 licensure, medico-
legal responsibility, and payment of wages.
Allocation of Resources
Relationships arose during the POD events that made
important resources available. Our prophylaxis efforts
took place in occupational settings, primarily for employ-
ees at these settings. Management and labor representa-
tives were important assets for facilitating POD opera-
tions. 
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Figure 2. Two (a, b) point of distribution site floor plans. Epi, epi-
demiologic; invest, investigation; admin, administration; eval, eval-
uation; Disp., Dispensing; Reg, registration. b, floor plan of POD
proper. The verification, epidemiology investigation, and criminal
investigation sections are located before the POD proper. The




2 Deputization formally gives a volunteer responsibilities and privi-
leges during the temporary assignment as an agent of DOH.
Responsibilities include following DOH rules on confidentiality,
handling medical records, making decisions on DOH’s behalf, and
stewarding resources (especially medications and equipment)
according to DOH protocol. DOH will in turn offer some protections
(e.g., proper equipment, malpractice coverage, worker’s compen-
sation coverage). 622 Emerging Infectious Diseases • Vol. 9, No. 6, June 2003
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DOH tried to limit antibiotic distribution to those who
needed them; the department used the opportunity to edu-
cate the public on the hazards of inappropriate antibiotic
use. Our role was to ensure access to antibiotics, educate
POD clients of the need to complete the prescribed regi-
men once started, and ensure that the health department
maintained critical public health functions. The concern
with anthrax is primary, not secondary, spread, and as
such, precious public health resources should not be used
to ensure adherence on a case-by-case basis.
Conclusion
Asuccessful POD is characterized by clarity (clear mis-
sion and eligibility criteria, clear lines of authority, clearly
defined responsibilities, clear antibiotic recommenda-
tions); communication (between the DOH incident com-
mand on site at the POD and organizations representing
those receiving prophylaxis); collaboration (with other
agencies that may be called upon to assist in delivery of
prophylaxis and law enforcement agencies needing to
gather information about the crime scene); coordination of
staffing and supplies; and prudent choice of POD site.
Future planning should include scenarios that address
alternative prophylactic modalities (e.g., immunization,
especially for smallpox), on-site infection control needs
(such as use of masks or isolation for symptomatic per-
sons), and automated management information systems for
more efficient operations. 
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